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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his
wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 860544

JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTY PURCELL
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal relate to the ability of
the plaintiffs to amend a final order of the Third Judicial
District Court entered approximately six years earlier.
ISSUE NO. 1
May a party file a motion to amend a final order of the
district court without first notifying the other party to
appoint counsel when counsel for the moving party is aware that
the other party is not currently represented by counsel?
ISSUE NO. 2
May a party file a motion to amend a final order of the
district court entered approximately six years earlier pursuant

to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
ISSUE NO. 3
Is the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered
August 13, 1986 void because it purports to set aside the Order
signed May 5, 1980 and to relate back and be effective as of
May 5, 1980 in contravention of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure?
ISSUE NO. 4
Was the alleged error in the judgment entered May 5, 1980
a clerical error that could be corrected by motion pursuant to
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For simplicity, references to pages in the record of
Civil No. 223407 will be preceded by "Rj" and references to
pages in the record of Civil No. C-78-8017 will be preceded by
"RH".
1.

In 1971 plaintiffs-respondents and defendant-

appellant entered into a transaction pursuant to which
defendant-appellant and others acquired an interest in certain
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah (Rj 3).
2.

In 1974 plaintiffs-respondents commenced a case

against defendant-appellant and others (Civil No. 223407),
seeking in their Amended Complaint a judgment against
defendants in the sum of $260,000 or reconveyance of the
- 2-

subject real property,

(Rj 221). In 1978 plaintiffs-

respondents commenced a separate action against defendantappellant and others (Civil No. C-78-8017) seeking a judgment
requiring the defendants to convey the subject real property to
plaintiffs or a judgment awarding plaintiffs the value of the
property.

(Rn 96). The trial court subsequently consolidated

these actions.
3.

(Rj 555).

On or about March 20, 1980, plaintiffs and defendants

executed a written stipulation regarding settlement and
dismissal of the legal actions in the consolidated cases. Such
Stipulation of Dismissal was prepared by counsel for
plaintiffs.

(Rj 991). A copy of such Stipulation of Dismissal

is attached hereto.
4.

On or about May 5, 1980, Judge Ernest F. Baldwin,

signed an Order dismissing the cases with prejudice.
Order was prepared by counsel for plaintiffs.

Such

(Rj 990). A

copy of such Order is attached hereto.
5.

In addition to the payments defendant-appellant had

made to plaintiffs-respondents, plaintiffs-respondents received
back the subject property with extensive improvements
defendant-appellant had made on the property, which
improvements had cost defendant-appellant in excess of
$50,000.
6.

(Rj 1109-1111).
On or about March 28, 1986 plaintiffs filed a Motion

to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet
Title.

(Rx 1009).
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7.

On or about March 28, 1986 plaintiffs filed an

Affidavit of Lester A. Perry in which Mr. Perry stated that Mr.
Ronald A. Barker "indicated that he no longer represented Ms.
Purcell and wants nothing to do with her."
8.

(Rj 1010).

Without giving defendant Pursell written notice to

appoint another attorney or to appear in person, plaintiffs
proceeded with their Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and
Enter Judgment of Quiet Title.
9.

(Rj 1110).

In plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter
Judgment of Quiet Title, plaintiffs state in the first sentence
of their argument:
Rule 60(b) allows the court to set aside an order or
judgment for any reason justifying relief from the
operation of the order or judgment. (Rj 1017).
10.

Plaintiffs submitted to the Court an Order and

Judgment of Quiet Title, which was executed by the Court and
entered on May 13, 1986.

(Rj 1037-1039).

A copy of such Order

and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto.
11.

Plaintiffs subsequently submitted to the Court an

Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, which was executed by the
Court and entered on August 13, 1986 with the handwritten
notation "Amended."

(Rj 1040-1042).

A copy of such Amended

Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto.
12.

On September 11, 1986 defendant Pursell filed a

Motion to Set Aside Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title
on the following grounds:

- 4-

a. That plaintiffs failed to give defendant written
notice to appoint counsel or appear in person as required
by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953).
b. That without notice to defendants plaintiff
sought an Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title
executed by the Court on August 13, 1986.
c. That a motion for relief of a final judgment or
order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure must be made "within a reasonable time," and
for certain reasons must be made within 3 months after
the order or judgment was taken.
d. That the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet
Title entered August 13, 1986 is void because it purports
to set aside the Order signed May 5, 1980 and to relate
back and be effective as of May 5, 1980 in contravention
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rj
1055-1057).
13.

On September 11, 1986 defendant Purse!i fxied an Ex

Parte Motion to extend time to file Notice of Appeal.

On the

same date the Court entered its order extending time to file a
Notice of Appeal to October 12, 1986, which date was 30 days
after the prescribed time for filing a Notice of Appeal with
respect to the Amended Order and Judgment entered August 13,
1986.

(Rj 1048-1049) .
14.

On or about September 15, 1986 plaintiffs filed a

Motion to Correct Clerical Error under Rule 60(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and a Motion to Set Aside Order
Extending Time to File Notice of Appeal.
15.

(Rj 1043-1044).

Without ruling on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside

the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, Judge David B.
Dee signed a third Order and Judgment of Quiet Title, which was
entered September 26, 1986.

(Rj 1091-1093).

A copy of such

Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is attached hereto.
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16.

Because the District Court had not ruled on

defendant Pursell!s motion to set aside the Amended Order and
Judgment of Quiet Title entered August 13, 1986, defendant
Pursell filed a Notice of Appeal on October 9, 1986 with
respect to both the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title
entered August 13, 1986 and the Order and Judgment of Quiet
Title entered September 26, 1986.
17.

(Rj 1097-1101).

On January 26, 1987, Judge David B. Dee entered an

order denying the motion of defendant Pursell to set aside the
Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered August 13,
1986 and denying the motion of plaintiffs to set aside the
Order Extending Time to File Notice of Appeal.
1117-1118).

(RI

A copy of such Order is attached hereto.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs could not amend the Order entered by Judge
Baldwin on May 5, 1980 for the following reasons:
(a)

Plaintiffs failed to require defendant Pursell

to appoint new counsel or appear in person before
plaintiffs proceeded with their motion to set aside the
order and enter judgment of quiet title in violation of
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953).
(b)

Plaintiffs were not entitled to amend the order

dated May 5, 1980 pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure because that rule requires that
a motion for relief must be made within a reasonable
time, and for certain reasons must be made within 3

- 6 -

months after the order or judgment was taken.
(c)

The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title

entered August 13, 1986 is void because it purports to
set aside the Order signed May 5f 1980 and to relate back
and be effective as of May 5, 1980 in contravention of
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) The alleged error of failing to include
reference to quiet title in the Order signed May 5, 1980
was not a clerical error subject to correction by motion
pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO
NEW COUNSEL OR APPEAR IN
WITH THEIR MOTION TO SET
QUIET TITLE IN VIOLATION
(1953).

REQUIRE DEFENDANT PURSELL TO APPOINT
PERSON BEFORE PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDED
ASIDE THE ORDER AND ENTER JUDGMENT OF
OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-51-36

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-36 (1953) provides:
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or
ceases to act as such, a party to an action or proceeding
for whom he was acting as attorney must before any
further proceedings are had against him be required by
the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another
attorney or to appear in person.
According to the Affidavit of Lester A. Perry dated March
17, 1986 and filed with the District Court as Exhibit "A" to
plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of
Quiet Title,
On March 10, 1986, I spoke with Mr. Ronald C. Barker, the
attorney of record for Ms. Purcell during the latter part
of the litigation within the case at bar. Mr. Barker
indicated that he no longer represented Ms. Purcell and
wants nothing to do with her. . . .
- 7-

Because plaintiffs1 counsel was aware that the attorney of
record had ceased to act as defendant Pursell's attorney,
counsel was required to notify defendant Pursell to appoint new
counsel or appear in person before proceeding with the Motion
to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title.
Accordingly, any actions by plaintiffs until counsel for
defendant Pursell entered his appearance should be void.
II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AMEND THE ORDER DATED MAY
5, 1980 PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE BECAUSE THAT RULE REQUIRES THAT A MOTION FOR RELIEF
MUST BE MADE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, AND FOR CERTAIN REASONS
MUST BE MADE WITHIN 3 MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER OR JUDGMENT WAS
TAKEN.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
in part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect;
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause,
the summons in an action has not been personally served
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonble time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
- 8 -

operation. . . .
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Set Aside Order and Enter Judgment of
Quiet Title was made pursuant to Rule 60(b), although
plaintiffs did not specify the exact reason for which they were
entitled to relief.

In their Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in support of Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title, plaintiffs argued:
Rule 60(b) allows the court to set aside an order or
judgment for any reason justifying relief from the
operation of the order or judgment. (Rj 1017).
The only possible basis for setting aside the Order dated May
5, 1980 was that counsel for plaintiffs had not included a
provision regarding quieting title in the Order that counsel
for plaintiffs had prepared and submitted to the court. A
motion to set aside an order due to mistake or inadvertance
must be made within 3 months after entry of the judgment or
order.

If relief is granted under a provision of Rule 60(b)

other than items (1), (2), (3), and (4), the motion must be
made within a reasonable time after entry of the judgment or
order.

Plaintiffs did not allege and the trial court did not

find that plaintiffs' motion, which was made nearly six years
after the court signed the Order date May 5, 1980, was made
within a reasonable time nor did the court enter any findings
as to a reason justifying relief from the operation of the
Order dated May 5, 1980.
III. THE AMENDED ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF QUIET TITLE ENTERED
AUGUST 13, 1986 IS VOID BECAUSE IT PURPORTS TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER SIGNED MAY 5, 1980 AND TO RELATE BACK AND BE EFFECTIVE AS
OF MAY 5, 1980 IN CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
_ 9 .

The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title dated
August 13, 1986 differed from the Order and Judgment of Quiet
Title dated May 13, 1986 in several respects.

The August 13,

1986 Order contained the following provision, not found in the
earlier Order:
3. This Order shall relate back to and be effective
as of May 5, 1980.
The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered
August 13, 1986 was based upon plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend
pursuant to Rule 60(b).

Rule 60(b), however, provides, in part:

. . . A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. . . .
The Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title could not relate
back and be effective as of May 5, 1980 because that would
affect the finality of the earlier judgment and suspend its
operation.

Accordingly, paragraph 3 of the Amended Order and

Judgment of Quiet Title is void.
IV. THE ALLEGED ERROR OF FAILING TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO QUIET
TITLE IN THE ORDER SIGNED MAY 5, 1980 WAS NOT A CLERICAL ERROR
SUBJECT TO CORRECTION BY MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 60(a) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing cases involving
alleged errors in judgments, has distinguished between clerical
errors and judicial errors.

In Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d

143 (Utah 1970), the defendant sought, ten years after judgment
was entered in another case, to correct an alleged clerical
error by an order in the case at bar.

The Court, citing 46 Am.

Jr. 2d Judgments §202, stated at page 145:
-10 -

The distinction between a judicial error and a
clerical error does not depend upon who made it. Rather,
it depends on whether it was made in rendering the
judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered.
The Court concluded that the trial court in the earlier case
may have erred in giving the plaintiff the remainder of the
land in question but that there was no clerical error
involved.

The error resulted from the failure of the judge to

follow the written agreement signed by the parties.

The Court

pointed out that only the plaintiff and her father knew whether
the decree entered by the court was according to their wishes
and intentions.

Neither of the parties appealed, and the

judgment became final nine years before an answer was filed in
the case at bar.

The Court stated:

The record does not show that the judgment did not follow
the findings of fact. Such an error must be corrected by
a timely motion for a new trial, by timely appealing the
matter, or by an independent action wherein all of the
parties to the original proceeding are made parties to a
new suit in equity.
In the instant case, plaintiffs1 counsel prepared the
Stipulation executed by the parties and the Order executed and
entered by the court.

The record does not show that the Order

did not follow the Stipulation prepared by the parties. The
error that plaintiffs allege occurred was not an error in
recording the judgment but was an error in rendering the
judgment (i.e., in preparing the Order that was signed by the
court).

Accordingly, under the reasoning of the Utah Supreme

Court in Richards v. Siddoway, plaintiffs cannot correct the
alleged error by a motion under Rule 60(a).
Plaintiffs-respondents also cited Stanger v. Sentinel
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) in support of
-11 -

their argument that the alleged error was a clerical error that
can be corrected upon motion under Rule 60(a).

The error in

that case involved the calculation of the amount of the
judgment.

The Supreme Court, citing a federal district court,

stated at page 1206:
"It is the type of mistake or omission mechanical in
nature which is apparent on the record and which does not
involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney."
[Citation omitted.]
In the instant case there is no mistake apparent on the
record.

The Order entered by the court follows in every regard

the written Stipulation prepared by plaintiffs1 counsel and
executed by the parties.

Moreover, the alleged error was not a

mechanical error involving the computation of a dollar amount,
as was the situation in Stanger.
In Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the trial
court signed an order submitted by counsel for a third party
defendant dismissing the case with prejudice.

After judgment

was entered against the defendants, the defendants, having
satisfied the judgment, instituted an action against the former
third party defendant, apparently for indemnification or
contribution.

The former third party defendant raised the

dismissal with prejudice as a bar to to the action, and the
defendants thereafter returned to the original trial court and
moved, under Rule 60(a), to correct the dismissal with
prejudice to one without prejudice.

Again this Court cited Am.

Jur. 2d to differentiate between a judicial error and a
clerical error.

The Court stated at page 402,

-12 -

Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a
substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error
is unilateral. The fact that an intention was
subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the
mistake to be "clerical." [Citations omitted.]
The Court then concluded:
In the instant case, the error complained
be characterized as "clerical." The court may
in granting Parrish Oil Tools a dismissal with
but the appropriate remedy was a timely motion
and/or a timely appeal to this Court.

of may not
have erred
prejudice,
to amend

In the instant case, the error complained of (i.e., that the
Order should have been a judgment that quieted title in
plaintiffs) is very similar to the error complained of in
Lindsay, where Order of Dismissal was with prejudice.

The

alleged error is not clerical.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court ordered "quiet
title" but that the subsequent written judgment omitted those
words.

The minute entry in the case states:
The within case settled as set out in the Record.
979).

(Rj

The transcript of the conference before the judge, which was
attached to plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter
Judgment of Quiet Title, does not reflect any order of "quiet
title" by the judge.

The only reference in the record to quiet

title is an uncompleted sentence by defendant's counsel. The
settlement between the parties was described by defendant's
counsel as follows:
In the two consolidated cases our stipulation is we
dismiss all of our claims and counterclaims and rights of
appeal and quit-claim any right, title or interest in and
to the real property involved in exchange for a complete
and total release by Blodgetts in both cases as to their
-13 -

claims and as to their judgment.
That characterization of the settlement was not disputed by
plaintiffs1 counsel, and the rest of the hearing was spent
dealing with the mechanics of implementing the stipulation.
Contrary to the allegation of plaintiffs1 counsel, there was no
order of quiet-title.
Moreover, on or about January 18, 1980 plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Judgment Against Defendant Betty Purcell, in which
plaintiffs sought a judgment ordering the transfer of any and
all interest of Betty Purcell and Raco Car Wash Systems in and
to the property to the plaintiffs, the release to plaintiffs of
the sum of $2,450 on file with the Clerk's Office and finding
defendant in contempt of court for failing to execute the
quit-claim deed.

Defendant Betty Purcell had refused to

execute the Quit Claim deed on the ground that she did not have
any interest in the property.

Plaintiffs argued that counsel

for defendant Betty Purcell had:
stipulated in open court than [sic] in exchange for a
release of any claims by plaintiffs against said
defendant, said defendant on behalf of herself and her
corporations would execute a quit claim deed in favor of
the plaintiffs to all of the property in question. (Rj
982).
In plaintiffs' Motion there was no reference to an order for
quiet title.
Even if there had been a more definitive reference to
quiet title by the parties in the conference with Judge
Baldwin, the subsequent Stipulation signed by the parties
superceded any prior discussion concerning quiet title. The

-14 -

Order signed by the trial court clearly places the instant in
the same category as the Lindsay case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs-respondents filed several motions with the
trial court in an attempt to correct an alleged error in the
Order entered May 5, 1980.

If the alleged error was an error

identified in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiffs-appellants failed to identify the nature of the
error or to show that their motion to set aside that order was
filed within a reasonable time after the Order was entered.
Accordingly, the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title
entered by the trial court on August 13, 1986 was errorneous.
The alleged error was a not a clerical error under the
prior rulings of this Court.

Therefore, the Order and Judgment

of Quiet Title entered by the Court on September 26, 1986 was
in error.
Defendant-appellant requests the Supreme Court to reverse
the Amended Order and Judgment of Quiet Title entered by the
trial court on August 13, 1986 and the Order and Judgment of
Quiet Title entered by the trial court on September 26, 1986.
Dated this

day of June, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

James A. Arrowsmith
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1987 I

delivered four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to:
Lester A. Perry
Robert M. Dyer
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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JOSEPH C. RUST
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM p. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT,his
wife,
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
et al.,

Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017
(Consolidated)

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * *
Plaintiffs and defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car
Wash Systems, Inc. and Water Park Corporation stipulate and
agree as follows:
1.

To the extent that judgment has not heretofore been

entered, the Complaint of plaintiffs against the said defendants
and specifically any claim of plaintiffs against defendant
Betty Purcell Martsch with regard to the property in question
are to be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Any and all counterclaims by the defendants are to

be dismissed with prejudice.
3. The judgments

heretofore entered against defendants

Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc. and Water Park Corporation are deeme
paid and satisfied.
4.

Any monies on deposit, specifically including the sum of

$2,450 heretofore deposited by Michael Roll dba Aaron's Cottonwood Mowers as property rentals, are to be paid to plaintiffs.
5.

Judgments heretofore entered against any of the said

defendants by the court will not be appealed to the Supreme Cour
ITON ft McCONKIE
'TORNEYS AT LAW
30 S THIRD EAST
T LAKE CITY UTAH

oo',o#

of the State of Utah.
6.

Each party is to bear its own cojts.

Dated this 20

day of March, 1980.

KIRTON & McCONKIE
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BARKER

Attorney for Betty Purcell
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JOSEPH C. RUST

KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
3 30 south Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *
WILLIAM j&. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his
wife,
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017
(Consolidated)

JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,
et al.,
Defendants.

Upon the Stipulation of counsel and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that to the
extent judgment has not heretofore been

entered, the Complaint

of plaintiffs against defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco
Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and any and all counterclaims of said
defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and each party
to bear its own costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sum of $2,450 on deposit
with the court in this case be paid over to plaintiffs by the
clerk of the court.
Dated this _[

day of

1930.

ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JUDGE
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Lester A. Perry - A2571
Robert M. Dyer - A0495
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

s u n -

.

fS^Q^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGEMENT
OF QUIET TITLE

vs,
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,

Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017 (Consolidated)

Defendants.
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Aside
Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgement of Quiet Title came for
hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled
court on May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m.
Plaintiff was present by and through its

counsel of

record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.
Defendant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not
present, either in person or through counsel;

said defendant

having been previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the
associated pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986.
McConkto
jftlmtll
>nal Corporation
300 EAST
AKt DTV
^64111

\ \ ^

The court being fully advised in the premises and having
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and
decrees:
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5,
1980 by the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set
aside.
2. Judgement is hereby entered against Betty
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right,
title and interest of said defendant within the following
identified real property in and to the plaintiffs 1 , William D.
Blodgett and Florence G. Blodgett.

The real property to which

this quiet title judgement applies is located within Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and is more particularly identified as:
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South),
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
0°20 f 50 M East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0
feet; thence south 89°15l45" West 197.17 feet; thence South
0°17 I 45 M West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street
(6100 South); thence North 89°15l45" East along said North
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning.

n. McConki*
Bu»hn*lt
ssionai Corporation
S 300 EAST

i tAKi c m
TAM 84111

Excluding from said above-described property that certain
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and more particularly described as follows: Beginning at the
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast
corner of said Section 16? and tangency to the curve of said
-2-

n.^O,

QQSA*~-

Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38°54,40M East;
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius
curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street.
Dated this

/7

da

y

o f Ma

y>

1986

«

BY THE COURT:

d B. Dee, p i s t r i f t Judge
&

y-f

Drtnuty Clerk

tfcConkie
«hn«ll
na! Corporation |
JOO EAST
(kKE CITY
I 84111

-3-

GOl--^*

-// - y

y

£lb.'V:epJ
Br

_JLA#A^

^w*-gr-»^

Lester A. Perry - A2571
Robert M. Dyer - A0495
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
4'. .'•:.-*
:
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WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF QUIET TITLE

vs.
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
a*a BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,

Civil No. 223407l/and
C-78-8Q17 (Consolidated)

Defendants.
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs1 Motion To Set Aside Order
of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title came for hearing
before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled court on
May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m.
Plaintiff was present by and through

it's counsel of

record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. Defendant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not present,
either in person or through counsel;
previously

served

with

Plaintiffs'

said defendant having been
Motion

pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986.

, McConkle
Buahnel!
svonal Corporation
5 300 EAST
LAKE OTY
AM 84111

and

the

associated

The court being fully advised in the premises and having
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and
decrees:
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty Purcell,
aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 1980 by the
Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set aside.
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell, aka
Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right, title and
interest of said defendant within the following

identified real

property in and to the plaintiffs', William D. Blodgett and Florence
G. Blodgett.

The real property to which this quiet title judgement

applies is located within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is
more particularly identified as:
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South),
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
0°20'50" East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0
feet; thence south 89015,45w West 197.17 feet; thence South
0°17'45" West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street
(6100 South); thence North 89°15'45" East along said North
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning.

McConkie
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>nal Corporation
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Excluding from said above-described property that certain
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and more particularly described as follows: Beginning at the
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast
corner o£ said Section 16; and tangency to the curve of said
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38o54'40M East;
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius
-2-

001

ur-k

curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street.
3.

This Order shall relate back to and be effective as of

May 5, 1980.
4.

The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants Betty

Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and all counterclaims of said defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice with
the parties to bear their own costs.
5.

The sum of $2,450 on deposit with the court in this

case be paid over to plaintiffs by the clerk of the court.
Dated this

/

*> day of August, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

». Dee,

n e t Judge

ATTES
H. DIXON.
*y
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Lester A. Perry - A2571
Robert M. Dyer - A0495
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka RF.TTY PURCELL MARTSCH,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF QUIET TITLE
Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017 (Consolidated)

Defendants.
Be it remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Aside
Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title came for
hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee, of the above entitled
court on May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten o'clock a.m.
Plaintiff was present by and through it's counsel of
record, Mr. Lester A. Perry, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.
Defendant, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, was not
present, either in person or through counsel; said defendant
having been previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the
associated pleadings by personal service on April 1, 1986.

0010^

The court being fully advised in the premises and
having considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges
I

and decrees:
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty
Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered May 5,
1980 by the Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set
aside.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell,

aka Betty Purcell Martsch, quieting Title of all right, title and
interest of said defendant within the following identified real
property in and to the plaintiffs1, William D. Blodgett and
Florence G. Blodgett.

The real property to which this quiet

title judgement applies is located within Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and is more particularly identified as:
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland
Drive on the projected North line of Vine Street
(6100 South), said point being North 668.9 feet,
more or less, and West 215.3 feet, more or less,
from the Southeast corner of Section 16, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 0°20,50,t East
along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 feet;
thence south 89°15 ! 45" West 197.17 feet; thence
South 0°17 45" West 154.0 feet to North line of
Vine Street (6100 South); thence North 89°15 , 45 H
East along said North line 197.03 feet to the
point of beginnning.
Excluding from said above-described property that
certain property taken by Salt Lake County as a
part of the Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1,
-2n, McConkie
Bushnell
S 300 EAST
T LAKE CITY
I AH H 4 1 U

OOIGC:

and more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the intersections of grantors West
property line and centerline of survey at
Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is North
668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the
Southeast corner of said Section 16; and tangency
to the curve of said Engineer's Station 376+92.29
bearing South 38°54'40" East; thence North 116.0
feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius curve to
the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or
less, to the North line of 6100 South Street;
thence West along the North line of 6100 South
Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to grantors West
boundary line, the place of beginning, less Tract
deeded to Salt Lake County and Street.
3.

This Order shall relate back to and be effective

of May 5, 1980.
4.

The Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants

Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water
Park Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and
all counterclaims of said defendants are hereby dismissed with
prejudice with the parties to bear their own costs.
5.

The sum of $2,450 on deposit with the court in th

case be paid over to plaintiffs by the clerk of the court.
Dated this *JJo day of September, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

DkVlDB. DEE/ D i s t r i c t Judge
H.JOi ON h ^ D L P Y
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Lester A. Perry - A2571
Robert M. Dyer - A0495
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 30 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his
wife,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL,
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH,

Civil No. 223407 and
C-78-8017 (Consolidated)

Defendants.
The motion of Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch,
to set aside the amended order of Judge David Dee, dated August
13, 1986, and the Motion of the plaintiffs, William D. Blodgett
and Florence G. Blodgett, to set aside the order of Judge David
Dee extending the time of defendant Purcell to file a notice of
appeal came for hearing before Judge Dee on November 24, 1986 at
11:00 a.m.

i, McConki*
Buthn*ll
.yonai Corporation |
D 300 EAST
LAKE CilV
AH 84111

Defendant Purcell was not present in person but was
represented by counsel, Mr. James A. Arrowsmith.

The plaintiffs,

the Blodgetts, were not present in person, but were represented
by counsel, Mr. Lestter A. Petty of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell.
The court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and
being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders that the
motion of defendant Purcell to set aside the amended order of
August 13, 1986 is denied, and the motion of the plaintiffs to
set aside the order extending time to file anotice of appeal is
denied.
DATED this ^/?day of January, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

&4fe._

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the above an4
foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to James A. Arrowsmith, 2102
East 3 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84109, this f^' day of

January, 1987.
)
t

^
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS

78-51-36

78-51-34. Change of attorney.—The attorney in any action or special
proceeding may be changed at any time before judgment or final determination, as follows:
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or entered upon the
minutes.
(2) Upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the application
of the client, after notice to the attorney.
ore paid. Sandbeig v. Victor Gold &
History: R S. 1898 k C. L. 1907, § 117;
C. L 1917, § 3 2 8 ; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
6-0-33.
Kotice of withdrawal.
Where counsel who fil^d answer for
defendants had attempted to withdraw
;
tom ense before day set for trial, but
lid not givo notice or have minute entry
m'ide of his withdrawal, as required by
this section, court did not err in proceedttith trial in absence of defendant•»
ti\^
ur their attorne>, since plaintiff's counsel
and court were justified in relying upon
notice g n en attorney for defendants until
such time as he had withdrawn from case
,i.« provided bv slntute. Staheh v. Adams,
',6 l \ 276, 190"P. 781.
Order of substitution.
Where circumstances leading to appliation foi substitution of attorneys indicate bad faith, collusion, fraud, or
attempt to cheat attorney of record out
•it his just claims, court will not make
order of substitution until such claims

Silver Min. Co., 18 U. 66, 55 P . 74.
District court's order g r a n t i n g motion,
made during pend< ncy of action by person
to whom plaintiff, without knowledge of
his uncompensated attorneys, had assigned
his cause of action, for substitution of
attorneys, held appealable to Supreme
Court, by supplanted attorneys, as final
judgment. Sandberg v. Victor Gold &
Silver Min. Co , ]8 U. 66, 55 P. 74.
Collateral References.
Attorney and ClientC=>75(l), 76(1).
7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §119 et
seq.
7 Am. J u r . 2d 132 et seq., Attorneys at
Law § 138 et seq.
Adjustment or determination of compensation of discharged attorney as condition of substitution of attorney by
court order, 124 A. L. R. 725.
Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution
of counsel in criminal case as ground for
continuance, 73 A. L. R. 3d 725.

78-51-35. Effect—Notice of change.—When an attorney
provided in the next preeeding section [78-51-34], written
change and of the substitution of a new attorney or of the
the party in person must be gi\en to the adverse party;
aiu&t recognize the former attorney.
History: E. 8. 1898 & 0. L. 1907, § 118;
C L. 1917, § 3 2 9 ; K. S. 1933 * C. 1943,
6-0-34.
Necessity for notice of change.
Under this section, an attorney who
aas appeared for a party may be treated
as such by opposing counsel until opposing counsel are notified of dismissal or
Jiange of attorneys. Notice of appeal
may be served upon him. Salina Canyon
Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 U. 372, 290 P. 161.

is changed as
notice of the
appearance of
until then he

Collateral References.
Attorney and ClientC=>75(l), 76(1).
7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 123.
Construction and effect of s t a t u t o r y
provision requiring adverse p a r t y to give
notice when attorney .ceases to act as
such, 42 A. L. R. 1347.

78-51-36. Notice to appoint successor.—When an attorney dies or is
removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an action
or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney must before any
further ^proceedings are had against him be required by the adverse party,
by written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in person.
575
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R u ] e 60

new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extnnsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
J^nMy
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and t h ^ r f S t o i S j
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it Is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any ^
^
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shaHbe made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), f3>, or (4), not more th^n 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered T t a k e n A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the f , n J E ^ a £ £ ^ i or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a c o i r t T e n t e r tain an independent action to relieve « party from a judgment, orde/or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The pr^edure for
ob aming any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as J ^ S S ^ ^
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is patterned
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F R C P

Cross-ReferenrP*
to ^ S ^ t T l

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment
Void judgment
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts
—Intent of court and parties
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel
—Predating of new trial motion.
Other reasons
—"An} other reason justifying relief."
Default judgment
Imposibihty of compliance with order
Incompetent counsel
Lack of due process
Merits of case
Mistake or inadvertencce
Real party in interest.
Requirements
—Effect of set-aside judgment
Admissions
—Fraud
Divorce action
—Independent action.
Constitutionality of taxes
Divorce decree
Fraud or duress
Motion distinguished.
—Invalid summons.

189
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Dev. Corp. v. Suther, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Cited in National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435,
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v.
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61
(1964); J a m e s Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318,
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson. 29
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v

Slate, 5f>4 V 2d 231 (Utah 1976>, Edjrar v.
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com.
Fin Corp v. Rrimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
(Utah 1980>; Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne.
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulhenn v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 * Utah
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v Gardner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983>; Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983»; Golden
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
1985); York v. Unqualified
Washington
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. J u r . 2d New Trial
§& 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J S. New Trial Sfc 13 et seq ,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial

of same case, or amount of verdict therein. 15
AL.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A L.R 4th 1170.
J u r y trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial. 48 A.L R 4th 747.
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=> 13 et seq..
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may he so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; n e w l y discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
188

